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TYLER V. CAIN:1 A FORK IN THE PATH FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OR THE END OF THE ROAD
FOR COLLATERAL REVIEW?
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Tyler v. Cain 3 is the latest decision in the ongoing evolution of the
retroactivity doctrine in habeas corpus proceedings.4 The main issue this
note presents is whether a state or federal inmate may apply a new
constitutional rule promulgated by the Supreme Court retroactively on
collateral review through a second or successive petition for habeas
corpus, even though the rule was not applicable to the inmate’s original
case.5 Under English common law, all new rules applied retroactively
1. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3. Tyler, 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
4. See generally John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine “As
Applied”, 61 N.C. L. REV. 745 (1983) (providing a general background of retroactivity in habeas
corpus proceedings). In this article, Corr summarizes the problems inherent in the doctrine of
retroactivity:
At first glance, retroactivity analysis seems quite straightforward. It is a process by
which courts determine whether a new judge-made rule of law should be applied to
events arising before the new law was promulgated. In order that those determinations
be marked with some degree of fairness and predictability, retroactivity analysis involves
an attempt to develop rules or guidelines helpful to judges in their efforts to make just
retroactivity decisions. Implicit in that effort is the prospect that in an appropriate
circumstance a given decision will not have retroactive effect, but will apply only to
cases or events arising after some particular date. Much of the difficulty in retroactivity
analysis has arisen in the attempt to formulate workable rules or guidelines for
determining when a decision will be held wholly or partially prospective.
Id. at 745-46.
5. See id. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998) for a good example of a
petitioner seeking to apply a new rule retroactively to his case on collateral review. In Bousley, the
petitioner sold drugs out of his garage and had weapons in his bedroom. 523 U.S. at 616. The
petitioner was charged with possession of methamphetamines with intent to distribute under 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1990) and the use of a firearm during the commission of drug trafficking under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (imposing minimum sentences for using a firearm to further the commission
of a crime of violence or drug trafficking). Id. Petitioner plead guilty to both charges. Id. After an
unsuccessful appeal, the petitioner filed a petition for federal habeas corpus alleging that he made
the pleas unknowingly and involuntarily. Id. at 616-17. The District Court denied relief, and the
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on both direct and collateral review.6 However, a divergence has
occurred under American jurisprudence as to when new constitutional
rules announced by the Court apply retroactively.7 Because of the
petitioner appealed this decision. Id. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Id. In Bailey, the Court held the use prong in 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1) requires the Government to show “active employment of the firearm,” which includes
“brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire”
the gun. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 148 (1995). However, the Court held the term
use, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) did not include the “mere possession of a firearm.” Id. at 143. On
appeal, the petitioner argued the rule from Baily should apply retroactively to his case on collateral
review, and that, as such, the petitioner could not be charged with use of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§924(c)(1) because he simply had the weapons in his house and did not use them to further the
commission of the crime. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 617-18. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court’s denial of relief. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that, although the
petitioner’s claim was procedurally defaulted, the petitioner might be able to have a hearing on the
merits, if he made the necessary showing to relieve the default. Id. In addition, the Court held
Petitioner’s claim could still be reviewed if he could show the constitutional error in his plea
agreement “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 623 (quoting
Murry v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). See also Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a
Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075 (1999). In this
article, Roosevelt illustrates the unique problems of retroactivity. Id. He states:
The question of retroactivity is what to do when the law changes. More precisely, it is to
whom the new law should be applied, and to whom the old. There are different answers
to the question of differing degrees of plausibility. Some are quite old and others fairly
new. But lurking behind the various instances of the question and its proposed solutions
is a distinct intellectual difficulty, which I will call the problem of retroactivity.
Id. at 1075 (citations omitted).
6. Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 347 (1997)
(presenting a general overview of the history of habeas corpus in both England and the United
States).
7. Id. In the United States, new constitutional rules announced by the Court generally apply
retroactively on direct review (appeal). Id. However, new rules generally do not apply retroactively
on collateral review. Id. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan argued new rules should always apply
retroactively on direct review, but generally not on collateral review. Id. See also Roosevelt III,
supra note 5, at 1076-79. In this article, Roosevelt explains the unique problems with retroactivity.
Id. at 1076. More specifically, Roosevelt notes that law changes through judicial and legislative
action, and retroactivity at least partially depends on the “positive source” of each type of law. Id.
Legislative action is “presumptively treated as non-retroactive” because the positive source of the
law is the bill itself. Id. at 1075. Judicial action is more complex and requires a greater analysis of
the different types of law encompassed within the arena of judicial action. Id. at 1076. The three
types of law that fall under the broad category of judicial action are common law, interpretation of
statutes, and constitutional law. Id. Judicial decisions interpreting statutes are “evidence of what
the law is, but they are not, except in a purely predictive sense, the law.” Roosevelt III, supra note
5, at 1076-79. “The [positive source of the law] is the statute; take it away, and the judicial
decisions lose their force.” Id. at 1076.
Since an unchanging statute backs the judicial interpretations, it makes sense to say that
while decisions may change, the law remains the same. An overruled decision is simply
wrong; it is not and was never the law. Consequently, retroactivity in statutory
interpretation is not very difficult. The new, correct decision is applied to everyone.
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divergence in American law, the doctrine of retroactivity has gradually
taken shape over the past forty years, with the Court solidifying its
stance in Tyler v. Cain.8
This note explores the effect that Tyler v. Cain has on habeas
corpus. More specifically, this note focuses on the Court’s interpretation
of section 2244(b)(2)(A).9 Part II documents the evolution of the
retroactivity doctrine.10 Next, Part III sets forth the facts, procedural
history, and holding of Tyler v. Cain.11 Part IV, Sections A and B
Id. The next type of law encompassed in judicial action is common law. Id.
[The] positive source of the common law is just the judicial decisions in which it is
embodied. With no positive source independent of judicial decisions, the law must
change as the decisions change. Consequently, it makes sense to distinguish between old
law and new law. When law changes, there is a real question as to when it does so, and
there are real questions about to whom the new law should be applied.
Id. Thus, new judicial decisions based on common law only apply prospectively. Id. at 1124. The
final and probably most confusing type of law encompassed under judicial action is constitutional
law. Roosevelt notes that the complexity of determining decisions based on constitutional law
applying retroactively stems from difficulties surrounding the source of constitutional law. Id. at
1110-36. Indeed, Roosevelt points out that:
An analysis that works in terms of positive source is difficult, since the origin of
constitutional law proves surprisingly hard to identify [if] Constitutional law has a
positive source—the hallowed document—independent of judicial decisions. But the
view that the Constitution means now what it always has, and always will, has serious
difficulties. This is not to say that it does not have redoubtable defenders, nor that, as a
normative theory of interpretation, it is unattractive. The difficulty is rather that it is
hard to keep a straight face while suggesting that the current panoply of substantive and
procedural rights has always existed, or, to take a less controversial example, that the
First Amendment has always embodied its current congeries of doctrines and
distinctions. The idea of an unchanging Constitution, as a descriptive matter, is a poor
fit with the realities of doctrinal evolution. Functionally, constitutional law more closely
resembles common law than statutory interpretation.
Roosevelt III, supra note 5, at 1076-77. Because of this doctrinal confusion, issues concerning the
retroactivity of constitutional decisions still trouble courts. A prime example is the issue in the case
at bar. In Tyler, the petitioner sought to apply the new rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39
(1990) (invalidating certain jury instructions because they violated Due Process) retroactively on
collateral review. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659-60. The lower courts pondered whether the rule in Cage
applied retroactively. Id. However, the Supreme Court may have resolved the confusion by
holding the only time a new constitutional rule applies retroactively on collateral review is when the
Court holds the rule applies retroactively. Id.
8. The gradual evolution of the doctrine of retroactivity in habeas corpus proceedings started
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Linkletter, the Court addressed the issue of whether
new constitutional rules should apply retroactively on collateral review, and held that a court “must
then weigh the merits and demerits in each case” to determine if the rule should apply retroactively.
Id. at 629. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II. Generally, the problem with retroactivity has been described as a
“question of . . . what to do when the law changes. More precisely, it is to whom the new law
should be applied, and to whom the old.” Roosevelt III, supra note 5, at 1075.
11. See infra Part III.
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analyze the procedures inmates12 must follow under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to file petitions for habeas
corpus and the effect Tyler v. Cain has on this procedure.13 Finally, Part
IV, Sections C and D explore the constitutionality of Tyler v. Cain. 14
II. BACKGROUND
A. Habeas Corpus and the Retroactivity Standard
1. A Historical Review of Habeas Corpus
In its most basic form, the writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner
that is wrongfully detained to obtain immediate relief from illegal
confinement.15 Habeas corpus, also known as the “Great Writ,” is “the
most celebrated writ in the English law”16 because it allows prisoners to
have their convictions and sentences reviewed by a neutral court. Under
English Common Law, anyone convicted of a crime and sentenced
under the authority of the Crown could demand immediate review of the
conviction and sentence from the judges on the King’s Bench.17
In the founding years of the United States, the citizens18 valued the
writ of habeas corpus so much that the framers incorporated the writ into
the United States Constitution.19 However, the people of the early
Republic were skeptical about the concept of Federalism and were afraid
of a dominant federal government.20 As such, the writ of habeas corpus
12. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 575-76 (1960) (holding the writ of habeas corpus is
meaningless without a restraint of liberty).
13. See infra Part IV.A., IV.B.
14. See infra Part IV.C., IV.D.
15. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Habeas corpus is based on the principle that “in a
civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man’s
imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements
of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.” Id. at 402.
16. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. See also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75 (1807) (discussing habeas corpus and jurisdictional requirements for granting relief
under the writ).
17. See Hartman, supra note 6, at 338-39. Under the English doctrine of habeas corpus,
inmates could challenge their sentences or convictions imposed by a court, a government body, or
the King himself. Id.
18. Habeas corpus was important to early American citizens because they feared a corrupt and
tyrannical federal government. Id. at 339. Indeed, the people feared the new “King George
Washington” would abuse his power much like the old “King George of England.” Id.
19. “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
20. See Hartman, supra note 6, at 339. Hartman stated:
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originally was available only to inmates confined in federal prisons.21
Congress extended the availability of habeas corpus to state prisoners in
the Judiciary Act of 1867.22 Today, the federal writ of habeas corpus
allows any inmate to have a federal court review the constitutionality of
his or her conviction and sentence.23
2. Brown v. Allen24
The Supreme Court paved the foundation for the modern writ of
habeas corpus in Brown v. Allen.25 In Brown, the petitioners, who were
all inmates in a state penitentiary, challenged their death sentences.26
After exhausting all of the available state remedies, the petitioners
The American habeas was an essential element of the political compromise engendered
by the “Anti-Federalist State’s Rights vs. Federalist Strong Central Government” conflict
and tensions which began at the founding of our nation and continues througout our
nation’s history . . . the colonists viewed the writ of habeas corpus, like the Bill of
Rights, as a protection for citizens only against the new federal government . . . .
Conversely, the colonists had no fear that their states might abuse their power.
Id. Thus, American habeas was only made available to inmates confined in federal prisons. Id.
21. Id. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 14, Congress limited the availability of habeas
corpus to inmates of federal prisons, but prohibited federal courts from reviewing state court
decisions because of the fear of corruption within the federal government. Id. See also Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996).
22. The Judiciary Act of 1867 gave all federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas
corpus “where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or
of any treaty or law of the United States . . . .” The Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28 § 1, 14 Stat. 385
(1867). The change in federal habeas jurisprudence stems from the concern of protecting American
citizens from state governments in the aftermath of the Civil War. See Hartman, supra note 6, at
339.
23. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 6 (1976). Habeas Corpus is designed to give a person whose
liberty is restrained an immediate hearing to inquire into and determine the legality of the
determination. Id.
24. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (addressing the issue of when a federal court could hear a writ of
habeas corpus from a state inmate if the state court’s treatment of the legal claims were full and
fair).
25. Id. In Brown, the Supreme Court consolidated for review the three cases of Brown v.
Allen, Daniels v. Allen, and Speller v. Allen. Id.
26. Brown, 344 U.S. at 446-47. On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
all of the inmates’ convictions. Id. The inmates filed federal habeas petitions, and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the applications for review in all
three cases. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held if a state prisoner’s claim of a federal constitutional
right has been decided against him by a state supreme court and he has filed an application for
certiorari to this Court, he has satisfied the requirements that he exhaust all of his state remedies
before a federal court may grant an application of habeas corpus. Id. at 447. See also Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, 135 (1982) (holding that a petitioner’s claims can be exhausted when
state procedural bars prevent consideration of some claims that could have been raised). But see
Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989) (holding that a petitioner has not exhausted all available
state remedies for federal habeas review if the federal claim has not been presented in the state
courts, even if the petitioner raised other claims in the state supreme court).
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sought review of their convictions and filed writs of habeas corpus in the
federal district court.27 The inmates alleged their federal constitutional
rights had been violated and, as such, the federal district court could
review their claims through the writ of habeas corpus.28
The Supreme Court held the violation of a constitutional right can
be remedied through federal habeas corpus and a federal court may
independently review state court adjudications of federal questions, even
though the state court’s treatment of those legal claims was full and
fair.29 Nonetheless, the decision was silent on the question of whether
new rules made by the Court apply retroactively on collateral review.30
In fact, the Court did not address the issue of retroactivity until twelve
years later in Linkletter v. Walker.31
B. The Evolution of the Retroactivity Doctrine
1. Linkletter v. Walker 32
In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court faced the issue of whether the
new constitutional rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio,33 providing that
27. Brown, 344 U.S. at 447. In each of the three cases under Brown, the federal district court
considered the effect of the United States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on the same issues
raised on direct appeal by the inmates in deciding whether to grant federal habeas corpus review.
Id. at 450. The federal district court dismissed all three petitions because the issues had been
decided fairly in the state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Id. The dismissals of
the federal habeas petitions were affirmed on appeal. Id. at 446. After granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court held the reviewing federal court should not place any weight on the Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari if the Court does not provide a reason for the denial. Id. at 489-90
(Frankfurter, J., noting the position of the Court).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 462-63.
30. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 443.
31. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
32. Id. In Linkletter, the petitioner was convicted of burglary. Id. at 621. After his arrest, the
police took the petitioner to the police station and searched him. Id. In addition, police officers
entered and searched his home and his place of business and seized property and papers without a
search warrant. Id. The district court found probable cause incident to the arrest and held the
seizures were valid because the officers had reasonable cause for the arrest. Id. The petitioner filed
a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court after exhausting all his state remedies, and
sought to apply the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to his case on review.
Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 621.
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, the petitioner was convicted for possessing lewd and
lascivious books, pictures and photographs. Id. at 644. Three Police officers arrived at the
petitioner’s residence on a tip that a person was hiding out in the home in connection with a recent
bombing. Id. at 644. Upon their arrival, the officers knocked on Mapp’s door and demanded
entrance into the home, but Mapp refused to admit the officers without a search warrant. Id. The
officers set up surveillance of the home, and again tried to enter the house a few hours later when
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illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in criminal trials, should
The Court
apply retroactively to habeas corpus proceedings.34
determined the U.S. Constitution neither prohibits nor requires the
retroactive effect of new rules.35 In addition, the Court held that a
reviewing court must weigh the merits and demerits in each case36 to
determine if a new rule should apply retroactively.37 Finally, the Court
promulgated a three-pronged balancing test for reviewing courts to
follow to determine if new rules should apply retroactively on collateral
review.38 First, a reviewing court should consider the prior history of the
new law.39 Next, the reviewing court should look at the purpose and
effect of the law.40 Finally, the reviewing court should determine
whether retrospective operation of the rule would further or retard its
operation.41

more officers arrived at the scene. Id. However, Mapp did not come to the door this time, so the
officers forcibly opened one of the doors of the house. Id. Mapp’s attorney arrived in the middle of
the affray, but the officers did not allow him to see Mapp or enter the house himself. Id. During
this incident, Mapp demanded to see a search warrant. The officer held up a piece of paper
claiming it to be a warrant. Id. at 645. Mapp grabbed the paper out of the officer’s hand and a
struggle ensued between the officer and Mapp. Id. Because of this altercation, the officer
handcuffed Mapp claiming she was being belligerent in resisting an official warrant. Id. Next, an
officer grabbed Mapp and twisted her hand even though she pleaded with him to stop because it was
hurting her. Id. Finally, Mapp was taken upstairs in handcuffs while the officers searched her
dresser, a chest of drawers, and her closet without her consent. Id. The search ultimately produced
the obscene materials that Mapp was later convicted of possessing. Id.
34. In Mapp, the Court held all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658-59.
The Court also held the exclusionary rule was applicable to the states. Id.
35. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. See also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
36. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
37. Id. See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1967). In Stovall, the Court held a
case-by-case analysis was necessary to determine whether a new constitutional rule would apply
retroactively. Id. In addition, the Court established a three-prong balancing test to determine if a
rule applies retroactively. Id. at 297. The relevant factors are: (1) the purpose to be served by the
new standards; (2) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards;
and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
Id.
38. Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618, 629. See also Tehan v. U.S. ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1965)
(reaffirming its position in Linkletter that retroactivity requires an inquiry into the merits and
demerits in each case by looking at the prior history of the rule, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation).
39. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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2. Justice Harlan’s Theory on Retroactivity
Although Linkletter prevailed for over twenty-years as the standard
for retroactivity on collateral review,42 the doctrine was substantially
influenced by two dissenting opinions penned by Justice Harlan in the
late 1960’s and early 1970’s.43 In Desist v. United States44 and Mackey
v. United States,45 Justice Harlan advocated the need for federal courts to
have more control over habeas corpus review and stricter standards for
applying new rules retroactively on collateral review.46 The theories
42. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305 (1989). The Court abandoned the Linkletter
standard and adopted the standard for retroactivity advocated by Justice Harlan. Id.
43. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
44. 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Desist, the petitioners were convicted of
conspiring to import and conceal heroin. Id. A substantial portion of the Government’s evidence
was obtained from tape recordings made by federal agents in an adjoining hotel room. Id. at 245.
The agents taped a microphone to the petitioners’ door at the hotel and recorded the conversations
pertaining to the drug offenses. Id. At trial, the court admitted the evidence of the petitioners’
conversations over the defendant’s objection because there was no “trespass” or “actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area.” Id. at 245-46. The petitioners appealed their convictions,
arguing the evidence was inadmissible because eavesdropping violated their rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 246. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners’ argument. Desist, 394 U.S.
at 246. Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) that a warrant showing probable cause was necessary to conduct electronic eavesdropping
because electronic eavesdropping is a search and seizure. Id. at 246. The petitioners sought to apply
the decision in Katz retroactively to their case on review, but the Court held the rule in Katz only
applied prospectively. Id. The Court rationalized that because Katz was a clear break from
precedent, the rule had only prospective application to electronic surveillance conducted after
December 18, 1967 (the day Katz was decided). Id.
45. 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Mackey, the
petitioner was indicted for five counts of evading payment of income taxes by willfully preparing
false and fraudulent tax returns. Id. at 668. A jury found Mackey guilty on all five counts. Id. The
court sentenced the petitioner to five years’ imprisonment, and a 10,000-dollar fine for each count.
Id. at 669 n.1. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 669. Meanwhile, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was
a valid defense to a prosecution for failure to register as a gambler and to pay the related
occupational and gambling excise taxes. Id. See also Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The petitioner filed a federal petition for habeas
corpus to vacate his sentence based on the rule established in Marchetti and Grosso. See Mackey,
401 U.S. at 670. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the principles established in
Marchetti and Grosso were not retroactively applicable on collateral review. Mackey, 401 U.S. at
672.
46. In Desist v. United States, Justice Harlan identified two functions of habeas corpus -- to
protect innocent people from wrongful convictions and to deter state courts from ignoring or
otherwise not vindicating federal constitutional rights. Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63. In Mackey,
Justice Harlan stated the:
[Retroactivity] doctrine was the product of the Court’s disquietude with the impacts of
its fast-moving pace of constitutional innovation in the criminal field. Some members of
the Court, and I have come to regret that I was among them, initially grasped this
doctrine as a way of limiting the reach of decisions that seemed to them fundamentally
unsound.
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found in these opinions are the foundation of the modern doctrine of
retroactivity in collateral proceedings.47 In Teague v. Lane, the Court
finally accepted the approach advocated by Justice Harlan.48
3. Teague v. Lane49
The next significant modification of the retroactivity doctrine in the
context of habeas corpus is Teague v. Lane. In Teague v. Lane, the
petitioner, a black man, was convicted by an all-white jury of three
counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count
of aggravated burglary.50 The Court faced the issue of whether the new
constitutional rule announced in Taylor v. Louisiana51 applied
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 676. Thus, Justice Harlan argued that new constitutional rules should not apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. See id. at 691-92. However, Justice Harlan recognized
two exceptions in which new rules should have retroactive affect. Id. at 692-93. The first exception
for when new rules could apply retroactively on collateral review is when new substantive due
process rules place “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” Id. at 692. The second exception for when new rules
apply retroactively on collateral review is for claims of nonobservance of procedures that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 693. Justice Harlan stated about the second
exception that:
[I]n some situations [sic] it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as well as
judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will
properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.
Id.
47. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982). The Court, guided by Justice Harlan’s
approach to retroactivity, held the rule announced in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980),
should be applied retroactively to the respondent’s case because a decision by the Court construing
the Fourth Amendment is applied retroactively to all convictions that were not final at the time the
decision was rendered. Id. See also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (embracing
Justice Harlan’s theories that new rules should not be applied retroactively in all situations and
adopting a rule similar to that advocated by Justice Harlan). But see Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas
Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2347 (1993) (stating that Justice Harlan’s theories on
retroactivity might be wrong).
48. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 292-93. In Teague, the Court described the petitioner’s trial as follows:
During jury selection for petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor used all 10 of his peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks. Petitioner’s counsel used one of his 10 peremptory
challenges to exclude a black woman who was married to a police officer. After the
prosecutor had struck six blacks, petitioner’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial
court denied the motion. When the prosecutor struck four more blacks, petitioner’s
counsel again moved for a mistrial, arguing that petitioner was “entitled to a jury of his
peers.” The prosecutor defended the challenges by stating that he was trying to achieve
a balance of men and women on the jury. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning
that the jury appeared to be a fair one.
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).
51. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Court held under the Sixth Amendment, the jury venire must
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retroactively to the petitioner on collateral review. The Court held that
generally, new rules made by the Court do not apply retroactively to
cases on collateral review.52 Following Justice Harlan’s example,53 the
Court noted two exceptions for when new rules should apply
retroactively on collateral review.54 First, a new rule should apply
retroactively if it “places certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe.”55 Second, a new rule should be applied retroactively if the
rule requires observance of “those procedures that . . . are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”56 However, the Court followed Justice
Harlan’s theory that the second exception should only apply to

be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Id.
52. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305.
53. In Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan stated that retroactivity for cases on collateral
review:
[Can] be responsibly made only by focusing, in the first instance, on the nature, function,
and scope of the adjudicatory process in which such cases arise. The relevant frame of
reference . . . is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the petitioner seeks, but
instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
54. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305.
55. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)). See also Benjamin Robert Ogletree, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1998). Under Teague, a new constitutional rule does not apply retroactively
to convictions that have been affirmed on direct review by a state supreme court before to the new
rule’s announcement. Id.
56. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). See also Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the
Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160 (1991). In this note, the author analyzes the
effects of Teague on habeas corpus and notes:
The result of the Teague decision was that the framework for review of habeas corpus
petitions had been redesigned, but not completely settled. After Teague, the doctrine
stood as follows: A presumption of non-retroactivity, and hence against consideration,
attached to every “new” claim raised in a petition for habeas corpus. If the claim at issue
were not “new,” there would be no barrier to a hearing on the merits. Unfortunately, the
Teague court provided two very different definitions of “new,” each subject to its own
interpretation, and both very broad. If the claim was indeed classified as “new,” the
presumption against consideration on the merits could be overcome only if one of two
exceptions were satisfied. The first allowed a consideration on the merits if the desired
rule would place the individual conduct in question beyond the enforcement power of the
state, that is, if the rule sought would declare certain activity legal rather than illegal.
The second exception allowed consideration on the merits if the rule sought was a
“watershed rule of criminal procedure” or if it implicated “those new procedures without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”
Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted).
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watershed rules57 of criminal procedure.58
4. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996 was the last significant modification of habeas corpus and
retroactivity before Tyler v. Cain.59 Before AEDPA, the gatekeeper
57. In Mackey, Justice Harlan refers to a watershed rule in his opinion:
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal constitutional error
at the time it became final, will be found, upon reflection, to have been fundamentally
fair and conducted under those procedures essential to the substance of a full hearing.
However, in some situations it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as well
as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will
properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction. For example, such, in my view, is the
case with the right to counsel at trial now held a necessary condition precedent to any
conviction for a serious crime.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-694.
58. See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 419 & nn.424, 425 (1995) (arguing the standard
in Teague v. Lane harms inmates on death row because it invites federal courts to hold that a
decision in a case decided after a petitioner has exhausted his direct appeals is a new rule that
cannot be applied retroactively). But see Linda Meyer, “Nothing We Say Matters”: Teague and
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 424 & n.3 (1994) (stating the policy behind Teague is to
prevent prisoners from endlessly attacking long-stale convictions on the basis of new constitutional
decisions).
59. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in various sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, & 42 U.S.C.); See generally
Hartman, supra note 6 (containing a good summary of the AEDPA). In addition, the AEDPA
imposed significant restriction on other areas of law including immigration law and the law
governing the investigation and prosecution of terrorism. See Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade
Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999).
In this article, Akram discusses some of the other legal consequences of the AEDPA. Id. at 70-76.
In particular, the author focuses on the new provisions of the AEDPA serving as a pretext to
conduct otherwise unconstitutional investigations and prosecutions of potential terrorists. See id. at
70-76. The author states:
Congress and the Administration passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) comprising a number of far-reaching provisions designed to
“combat terrorism.” [The] AEDPA authorizes the executive agencies to use sweeping
powers to investigate, charge, convict, and remove so-called “alien terrorists.” Among
[the] AEDPA’s provisions is one permitting the administration to criminally sanction
even peaceful activities of groups the government labels “terrorist organizations.” The
State Department published its list of terrorist organizations annually. Of the thirty
organizations published on that list, one third are either Muslim groups or from the
Middle East or North Africa. Under AEDPA, once a group is designated a “terrorist
organization,” none of its members are eligible for a visa, and any individual who has
been a member of that organization is deportable. Moreover, it is a crime to contribute
money or give material support to a designated “terrorist organization,” even if the
support is for humanitarian or charitable purposes. Finally, banks are required to freeze
the funds of such an organization and its “agents.” The most critical of AEDPA’s
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provisions gave reviewing courts discretion to determine whether they
would hear second or successive petitions for habeas corpus.60 A
reviewing court could dismiss a second or successive petition if the court
determined the petition was not based on different grounds for relief
than the first petition, or that the issue in the second or successive
petition had been decided already on the merits.61
Under the AEDPA, Congress eliminated a reviewing court’s
discretion to determine if it should hear a second or successive habeas
petition by mandating the dismissal of second or successive petitions.62
One of the main goals of the AEDPA is to curb the abuse of the federal
writ of habeas corpus.63 More specifically, the AEDPA aimed at
provisions [concerning terrorism and immigration] . . . is the provision permitting the use
of secret evidence to remove or deport “alien terrorists” residing temporarily or
permanently in the United States.
Id. at 70-71 (citations omitted).
60. Before the AEDPA, the gatekeeper provision provided “the sentencing court shall not be
required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same
prisoner.” Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115, 1122
(1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994). But see Federal Document
Clearing House Inc., Political Transcripts; News Conference, Webwire Anti-Terrorism Bill, Senate
Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman (April 15, 1996) (statement of Senator
Orrin Hatch) (arguing the AEDPA will curb the endless, frivolous, costly appeals of death
sentences).
61. Stahlkopf, supra note 60, at 1121.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (1996). The AEDPA gatekeeper provision in § 2244 provides in
part:
(a) No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court
of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined
by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus,
except as provided in section 2255.
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under
section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section
2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless –
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of
the offense.
Id.
63. Before the AEDPA, there was no limit on how many times a person could file for habeas
relief. See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In turn, this led to abuses of the writ
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eliminating the ability of death row inmates to prolong their executions
by filing second or successive habeas corpus64 petitions that are without
merit.65
C. Cage v. Louisiana 66
In Tyler v. Cain, the petitioner sought to apply the new rule
announced in Cage v. Louisiana retroactively to his case on collateral
review.67 In Cage, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder

because inmates were able to file successive and unfounded petitions. See id. These multiple
petitions harass courts and cause unwarranted delays. See id. The court describes abuse of the writ
in more detail:
[P]etitions for the writ are used not only as they should to protect unfortunate persons
against miscarriages of justice, but also as a device for harassing court, custodial, and
enforcement officers with a multiplicity of repetitious, meritless requests for relief. The
most extreme example is that of a person who, between July 1939 and April 1944,
presented in the District Court 50 petitions for writs of habeas corpus; another person has
presented 27 petitions, a third 24, a fourth 22, a fifth 20. One hundred nineteen persons
have presented 597 petitions – an average of 5.
Id.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) states “Before a second or successive application permitted by
this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate courts of appeals
for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
Section 2244(b)(3)(C) states that “[t]he court of appeals may authorize the filing of a second or
successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facia showing that
the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.”
65. In 1996, President Clinton signed The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 into law and stated the goal of the AEDPA is to “streamline Federal appeals for convicted
criminals sentenced to the death penalty.” President William J. Clinton, President Statement on
Antiterrorism Bill Signing (April 24, 1996), in 1996 WL 203049, *2. In addition, the President
stated:
There are three other portions of this bill that warrant comment. First, I have long
sought to streamline Federal appeals for convicted criminals sentenced to the death
penalty. For too long, and in too many cases, endless death row appeals have stood in
the way of justice being served. Some have expressed the concern that two provisions of
this important bill could be interpreted in a manner that would undercut meaningful
Federal habeas corpus review. I have signed this bill because I am confident that the
Federal courts will interpret these provisions to preserve independent review of Federal
legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle of an independent judiciary.
Section 104(3) provides that a Federal district court may not issue a writ of habeas
corpus with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in State court unless the
decision reached was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Some have suggested that
this provision will limit the authority of the Federal courts to bring their own
independent judgment to bear on questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact
that come before them on habeas corpus.
Clinton, 1996 WL 203049, at *2-3.
66. 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
67. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 659-60 (2001).
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and sentenced to death.68 Cage appealed this decision, arguing that the
jury instructions on the standard of reasonable doubt given at his trial
were unconstitutional.69 The Supreme Court agreed with Cage and held
that phrases such as “moral certainty” and “grave uncertainty,” as they
are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is
required by the Constitution for acquittal under the reasonable doubt
standard.70 The Court further held that when these statements are “then
considered with the reference to ‘moral certainty,’ rather than
evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree
of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.”71
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts
In 1975, Melvin Tyler got into an argument with his estranged
girlfriend.72 Later that night, Tyler went to his girlfriend’s house and
fired several shots from a .22 caliber pistol into one of her windows.73
68. Cage, 498 U.S. at 40.
69. In Cage, the jury instruction pertaining to reasonable doubt was as follows:
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the
defendant’s guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict
of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not
establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt,
however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible
substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as
would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the
unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a
mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable
man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical
certainty, but a moral certainty.
Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 41.
71. Id.
72. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659. In Tyler’s brief to the Supreme Court, the petitioner describes the
chain of events as follows:
On March 20, 1975, Melvin Tyler got into a fight with his girlfriend over whether she
would reconcile with her husband. After drinking himself into a rage, he went to her
house, stood in the alleyway outside the house, and fired a .22 caliber pistol into a draped
and enclosed window. Unbeknownst to him, Tyler’s twenty-day-old daughter lay asleep
under the window. Tyler’s shots ricocheted, hitting the infant, causing her death. Tyler
was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted of second-degree murder in the Criminal District
Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.
Petitioner’s Brief at 2-3, Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (No. 00-5961).
73. Id.
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The shots ricocheted from the window and killed their 20-day-old
daughter.74 A jury found Tyler guilty of second-degree murder and
sentenced him to life without parole.75
B. Procedural History
Tyler appealed the trial court’s decision,76 but the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed the decision.77 Tyler then turned to both federal
and state post-conviction relief. By 1986, Tyler had filed five (5) state
petitions for habeas corpus relief, all of which were denied.78 In
addition, the federal district court denied Tyler’s first federal habeas
petition, which was then affirmed on appeal.79
Next, Tyler filed a sixth state petition for habeas corpus after the
United States Supreme Court handed down the decision of Cage v.

74. Id. at 3.
75. State v. Tyler, 363 So. 2d 902 (La. 1978).
76. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659. Tyler challenged the jury instructions at his trial. Petitioner’s
Brief at 3, Tyler (No. 00-5961). More specifically, Tyler challenged the definition of reasonable
doubt the court gave to the jury, which is as follows:
If you entertain any reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the
defendant’s guilt, it is your sworn duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a
verdict of acquittal. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, yet if
it does not establish it beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This
doubt must be a reasonable one; that is, one founded upon a real, tangible, substantial
basis, and not upon mere caprice, fancy or conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would
give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your minds by reason of the unsatisfactory
character of the evidence; one that would make you feel that you had not an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the defendant’s guilt. If, after giving a fair and
impartial consideration of all the facts in the case, you find the evidence unsatisfactory
upon any single point indispensably necessary to constitute the defendant’s guilt, this
would give rise to such a reasonable doubt as would justify you in rendering a verdict of
not guilty.
The prosecutor must establish guilt by legal and sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, but the rule does not go further and require a preponderance of testimony. It is
incumbent upon the state to prove the offense charged, or legally included in the
indictment, to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is
not a mere possible doubt. It should be an actual or substantial doubt. It is such a doubt
as a reasonable man would seriously entertain. It is a serious doubt for which you could
give good reason.
Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
77. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659.
78. State ex rel. Tyler v. Blackburn, 494 So. 2d 1171 (La. 1986), State v. Tyler, 446 So. 2d
1226 (La. 1984), State ex rel. Tyler v. State, 437 So. 2d 1142 (La. 1983), State v. Tyler, 430 So. 2d
92 (La. 1983), State ex rel. Tyler v. Maggio, 428 So. 2d 483 (La. 1983) (all denying Tyler’s state
habeas corpus applications).
79. Tyler v. Butler, No. 88cv4929 (E.D. La.), aff’d, Tyler v. Whitley, 920 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.
1990) (decision denying Tyler’s federal habeas corpus application).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 5
GEHRING1.DOC

196

1/6/03 2:48 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:181

Louisiana in 1990.80 In this petition, Tyler claimed his rights had been
violated under the new rule established in Cage because the jury
instructions in his case were similar to the instructions the Supreme
Court found unconstitutional in Cage.81 Again, the state trial court
denied the petition, and then the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the
petition.82
Finally, in 1997, Tyler filed a petition in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 83 requesting permission to file a successive
petition in the federal district court for habeas corpus relief under section
2254.84 The Fifth Circuit ruled that it could not grant the habeas petition
unless Tyler made a prima facia showing85 that his successive petition
relied on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive on collateral
review by the United States Supreme Court.86 The Court of Appeals
found that Tyler made the requisite showing and granted him leave to
file the successive petition.87 Tyler then presented his claim to the
Federal District Court, which held the new constitutional rule in Cage
regarding jury instructions should apply retroactively,88 but that Tyler
80. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (holding the jury instructions violated the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the words “substantial” and “grave”
suggested a lower degree of proof than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard requires). See
supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
81. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659. The jury instructions the Court condemned in Cage defined
reasonable doubt using the following phrases:
It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by
reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof . . . it is an actual
substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is
required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.
Cage, 498 U.S. at 40. The jury instructions in Tyler v. Cain contained similar phrases. See supra
note 76.
82. State ex rel. Tyler v. Cain, 684 So. 2d 950 (La. 1996).
83. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 660.
84. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). This provision requires that a prisoner seeking a second
successive habeas petition must seek an order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court
to consider the petition. Id.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) states “[t]he court of appeals may authorize the filing of a
second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
87. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for the successive application, but limited the
issue in the application to “whether Cage v. Louisiana should be applied retroactively on collateral
review and whether the jury instruction on reasonable doubt given to his jury was unconstitutional
under Cage and Victor v. Nebraska.” Petitioner’s Brief at 5-6, Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001)
(No. 00-5961) (citations omitted).
88. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. at 660 (2001). The District Court determined the rule in Cage
applied retroactively on collateral review because of the decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding the new rule
established in Cage falls into the second Teague exception and thus can be applied retroactively on
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was not entitled to collateral relief.89 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision on different grounds.90 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari due to the conflict among the circuit courts91 as
to whether the new rule in Cage v. Louisiana should apply retroactively
on collateral review.92
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.93 The Court focused on whether the new rule
announced in Cage v. Louisiana applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review, in order to determine whether the successive habeas
petition brought by Tyler fell within the exception under the gatekeeper
collateral review). Petitioner’s Brief at 6, Tyler (No. 00-5961).
89. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 659. However, the District Court determined that the AEDPA changed
the standard of review and that a jury instruction similar to that in Cage was acceptable. Id. The
District Court also held “a state prisoner can only prevail if the state court’s decision was ‘contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.’” Tyler, 533 U.S. at 660. The District Court found that Tyler
did not overcome this barrier. Id.
90. Id. The Fifth Circuit held the District Court erred because it did not determine if Tyler met
the AEDPA’s successive habeas standards. Id. The AEDPA requires a district court to dismiss a
second or successive habeas petition unless the applicant shows the claim relies on a new rule made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
The Court of Appeals determined that Tyler did not meet this standard because, based on Circuit
precedent, Tyler could not point to any cases in which the Supreme Court made the rule in Cage
retroactive to cases on collateral review. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 660.
91. The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits all held that the new rule in Cage v.
Louisiana (pertaining to jury instructions) did not apply retroactively in collateral proceedings
because the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) required a petitioner to point to a Supreme
Court decision that made the rule retroactive in collateral proceedings. See id. See also In re Smith,
142 F.3d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding the rule in Cage is not retroactive because it was not
made retroactive by the Supreme Court); Rodriguez v. Superintendent, Bay State Correctional Ctr.,
139 F.3d 270, 271 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding Cage is not retroactive because no Supreme Court
decision expressly declares the availability of the rule or actually applied the rule in a collateral
proceeding); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1193 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Cage is not retroactive
because a new constitutional rule is made retroactive when the Supreme Court states the rule is
made retroactive to collateral proceedings, or applies the rule in a collateral proceeding); In re Hill,
113 F.3d 181, 181-82 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the Cage rule is not applicable in successive habeas
petitions because it was not made retroactive by the Supreme Court).
However, the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit held the rule in Cage v. Louisiana did apply
retroactively in collateral proceedings. See West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding the Cage rule is retroactive on collateral review based on the decision in Sullivan v.
Louisiana); Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing successive habeas
petition because the rule in Cage was made retroactive in Adams v. Evatt, 511 U.S. 1001, 1001
(1994), (vacating the decision from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals that held Cage was not
retroactive, and remanding the case for further consideration in light of Sullivan v. Louisiana)).
92. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 660.
93. Id.
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provision in section 2244(b)(2)(A).94 The majority, per Justice Thomas,
interpreted the meaning of the gatekeeper provision.95 Based on the
plain meaning of section 2244(b)(2)(A),96 the Court held a new
constitutional rule can only apply retroactively on collateral review if the
Supreme Court holds the law applies retroactively on collateral review.97
This being so, the Court held the new rule in Cage v. Louisiana does not
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review because the rule was not
made retroactive by any holding of the Court.98 Therefore, Tyler could
94. See id.
95. See id. at 661-63. See supra note 62. Under the exception in § 2244(b)(2)(A), the
petitioner must pass three prerequisites to qualify for relief in a second or successive habeas
petition. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661-63. “First, the rule on which the claim relies must be a ‘new rule’
of constitutional law; second, the rule must have been ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court’; and third, the claim must have been ‘previously unavailable.’” Id.
Louisiana did not dispute that Cage created a new rule of constitutional law that was not previously
available. Id. Thus, the only issue in the case was whether the new rule applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Id.
96. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662. Under the plain meaning analysis, the Court stated:
As commonly defined, “made” has several alternative meanings, none of which is
entirely free from ambiguity . . . . Out of context, it may thus be unclear which meaning
should apply in § 2244(b)(2)(A) and how the term should be understood. We do not,
however, construe the meaning of statutory terms in a vacuum. Rather, we interpret the
words “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
In section 2244(b)(2)(A), the word “made” falls within a clause that reads as follows: “A
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court . . . .” Quite significantly, under this provision the Supreme Court is the
only entity that can “make” a new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes retroactive,
not by the decisions of the lower court or by the combined action of the Supreme Court
and the lower courts, but simply by the action of the Supreme Court.
The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, “lay out and construct” a rule’s
retroactive effect, or “cause” that effect “to exist, occur, or appear” is through a holding.
The Supreme Court does not “make” a rule retroactive when it merely establishes
principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower
courts . . . . We thus conclude that a new rule is not “made retroactive to cases on
collateral review” unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.
Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662-63 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
97. Id. The Court stated the word “made,” in the context of § 2244(b)(2)(A), is synonymous
with the word “held.” Id. at 664. Congress does not need to use the word “held” to have the same
effect because Congress is permitted to use synonyms. Id. Indeed, the Court already determined in
Williams v. Taylor that Congress does not need to use the word “held” to mean as much. Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 364 (2000). In Williams, the Court held that in the phrase “clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” the word
“determined” refers to holdings in the context of § 2254(d)(1) as opposed to dicta. Id. at 412
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
98. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001). Tyler argued that the Court made the rule in Cage
retroactive on collateral review in Sullivan v. Louisiana, when combined with the “watershed
exception” established in Teague v. Lane. Id. This argument failed because the Court held the new
rule did not meet the two requirements under the “watershed requirement.” Id. at 665-66. See also
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229, 244-45 (1990) (holding that to fall under the second Teague
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not avail himself to the new constitutional rule in Cage, and thus his
successive petition was barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).99
Justice O’Connor cast the fifth vote in this case, which was
necessary for the Court to achieve a majority.100 In her concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor more fully explained the ways the Court
could expressly make a rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.101
Indeed, Justice O’Connor noted the most unmistakable instance when
the Court makes a new rule retroactive is by expressly holding the new
rule applies retroactively on collateral review and, in turn, applying the
rule retroactively on collateral review.102 In addition, Justice O’Connor
recognized that the Court could make a new rule retroactive through
multiple holdings that “logically dictate the retroactivity of the new
rule.” 103 By this, Justice O’Connor argued the Court could make a new
rule retroactive over the span of multiple cases if the rule falls into one
of the two exceptions found in Teague v. Lane.104
exception (the watershed exception), the new rule must meet two requirements: infringement of the
rule must seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, and the rule must
alter the bedrock procedural elements necessary for the fairness of a proceeding). However, the
majority did agree it could make a rule retroactive over the course of two cases, but that it did not do
so for the rule in Cage. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665-66. In addition, the Court stated that the only
holding in Sullivan was an error like the one in Cage - structural error - and that a structural error
does not per se alter a bedrock principle. Id. at 666. The Court stated, at most, Tyler’s argument
amounts to evidence that the Court should make the rule retroactive. Id. However, the Court
declined to make the rule retroactive. Id. at 668.
99. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 667-68.
100. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 668.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 669. Justice O’Connor stressed that for a new rule to be made retroactive over
multiple decisions, the conclusion must be strictly logical, and “the holdings must dictate the
conclusion and not merely provide principles from which one may conclude that the rule applies
retroactively.” Id. Therefore, Justice O’Connor argued that a rule can be made retroactive under
section 2244(b)(2)(A) “only where the Court’s holdings logically permit no other conclusion than
that the rule is retroactive.” Id.
104. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669. Justice O’Connor noted that “[i]t is relatively easy to demonstrate
the required logical relationship with respect to the first exception articulated in Teague v. Lane” (a
new rule making certain private conduct criminal that is beyond the government’s authority to
proscribe). See id. She stated:
When the Court holds as a new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of
primary, private individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking
authority to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has “made” that new rule
retroactive to cases on collateral review. The Court has done so through its holding
alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of principles by lower courts.
Id. As to a rule falling under the second Teague exception, Justice O’Connor argues the Court can
give a new rule retroactive effect without expressly holding as much if the rule alters a bedrock
procedural element necessary to the fairness of a proceeding. Id. at 670. If this is the case, the rule
could apply retroactively to cases under collateral review as long as logic dictates that the holdings
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In the dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued the Court did make
the rule in Cage v. Louisiana retroactive on collateral review.105 Justice
Breyer maintained the Court could make a new rule retroactive in two
cases when taken together, and in fact did with the rule in Cage.106
Therefore, the dissent would allow Tyler to avail himself of the
reasonable doubt jury instruction rule established in Cage v.
Louisiana.107
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Closer Look at Habeas Corpus under the AEDPA
1. Time Limitations under the AEDPA
To understand the affect of Tyler v. Cain on both state and federal
inmates seeking federal habeas corpus, it is important to understand the
process under the AEDPA that inmates must follow to file petitions for
federal habeas corpus review. First, sections 2244 and 2255 provide

over the span of cases make the new rule retroactive under section 2244(b)(2)(A). See id.
105. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 670-71. In the Dissent, Justice Breyer agreed with Tyler’s argument
that the Court made the rule in Cage retroactive on collateral review in Sullivan v. Louisiana, when
taken together with the watershed exception in Teague v. Lane. Id. In Cage, the Court announced
the rule that certain jury instructions “violated the Constitution because [they] inaccurately defined
‘reasonable doubt,’ thereby permitting a jury to convict ‘based on a degree of proof below that
required by the Due Process Clause.’” Id. at 670. Justice Breyer explained his rationale in the form
of a syllogism. See id. at 672-73. First, in Sullivan, the Court held that Cage falls within the
watershed exception in Teague because it alters the understanding of a bedrock procedural element
essential to fair trials. Id. at 671. Next, in Sullivan, the Court held that a “Cage violation can never
be harmless because it leaves the defendant with no jury verdict known to the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. at 672. Therefore, the rule in Cage applies retroactively to cases on collateral review because it
is a watershed rule and falls under the exception in Teague. Id. at 673. Justice Breyer states
“Ordinarily, in law, to hold that a set of circumstances falls within a particular legal category is
simultaneously to hold that, other things being equal, the normal legal characteristics of members of
that category apply to those circumstances.” Id. As such, the dissent urges that the rule in Cage
should apply retroactively on collateral review. Id.
106. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 671.
107. See id. at 675. Justice Breyer also argues that nothing in the AEDPA supports, let alone
requires, the decision of the Court. Id. at 676. He states the purpose of the AEDPA was to “bar
successive petitions when the lower courts, but not the Supreme Court, have held a rule not to be
‘new’ under Teague because dictated by their own precedent, or when lower courts have themselves
adopted new rules and then determined that the Teague retroactivity factors apply.” Id. (citations
omitted). Justice Breyer also noted the majority decision will most likely add not only more
procedural complexity, “along with its attenant risk of confusion, but also serious additional
unfairness.” Id. at 677.
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temporal guidelines that inmates must follow.108 Under section
2244(d)(1),109 a state inmate must file a petition for federal habeas
corpus no later than one-year after the date when the judgment became
final in his case.110 Section 2255 imposes a similar one-year limitation
on federal inmates seeking federal habeas corpus review.111 The
combined goal of these provisions is to curb the abuse of the writ by
preventing inmates from filing numerous habeas petitions years after the
final determination of the merits of their cases.112
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2255 (1996)
109. 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) states the one-year period of limitation shall
start to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Id. However, section 2244(d)(2) is a tolling provision, which provides that the time state postconviction remedies or claims are pending does not count towards the one-year limitation in §
2244(d)(1). See also Hartman, supra note 6, at 352-55 (containing a good review of sections
2244(d)(1) & (2)).
110. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (imposing time limits on habeas corpus), with United States
v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947) (holding that habeas corpus is a remedy without a time limit).
Based on this comparison, statutory law has deviated from the traditional common-law approach
that there should be no time limits on when a petitioner can file for federal habeas corpus review.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Much like its counterpart for state inmates in § 2244, the one-year
limitation for federal inmates contained in § 2255 starts to run from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed , if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
Id.
112. See statement by Senator Hatch, supra note 60. Hatch argues the AEDPA will eliminate
abusive and excessive habeas petitions filed by the same inmates. Id. One way the AEDPA will
achieve this goal is to eliminate the ability of inmates to file petitions one-year after the final
judgment in their cases. Id. But see Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the
Antiterrorism Act’s Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1998). Woolley
argues that constitutional remedies such as habeas corpus do not have time limits and the remedy of
federal habeas corpus is worthless because of the time limits imposed by Congress. Id. at 421.
Additionally, Woolley argues the AEDPA will not eliminate frivolous petitions because the
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2. Federal Inmate Procedure under the AEDPA
The AEDPA imposes different procedural requirements that state
and federal inmates must follow to file a petition for federal habeas
corpus review.113 Federal inmates must file a petition for habeas corpus
under section 2255 or section 2241.114 Under section 2255, federal
inmates may only challenge the imposition or validity of their
sentence.115 On the contrary, the remedies under section 2241 are much
broader.116 Under this section, federal inmates can challenge the
shortened time limits will encourage more inmates to file pro se petitions for habeas review to avoid
the expiration of the one-year deadline. Id. at 429. In turn, the increase in the number of inmates
filing pro se petitions to comply with the time limits will in fact increase the amount of meritless or
frivolous petitions filed each year. Id. Thus, the procedures imposed under the AEDPA effectively
undermine its own goals of eliminating frivolous petitions because it encourages inmates to file
petitions in order to comply with the one-year requirements to ensure their claims are not barred.
Id.
113. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (1996). See also Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day for
Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115, 1119-1120 (1998) (containing a good overview of the procedures
inmates must follow to file federal habeas corpus petitions). In addition, there are special provisions
governing the procedure for inmates filing for habeas review in capital cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§
2261-2266 (1996).
114. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255 (1996).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. (emphasis added).
Id. For example, a federal inmate may challenge the constitutionality of his sentence, or that the
district court did not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence. See e.g., Pruitt v. United States, 274
F.3d 1315, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001). In Pruitt, the petitioner filed a habeas petition under section 2255
challenging the validity of the sentence because it violated the ex post facto clause of the
Constitution. Id.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) provides in that:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless:
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is
committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an
order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States . . . .
Id.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The remedy in section 2255 is much broader
than the remedy in section 2241. Id. In United States v. Scott, the Tenth Circuit held it was
appropriate for an inmate to raise a claim for immediate release under section 2241 after the
expiration of his sentence. United States v. Scott, 803 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1986). See also
Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1120 (arguing that Section 2241 acts like a catch-all category, which is
broad enough to encompass claims that federal inmates cannot bring under section 2255).
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execution of their sentences.117
3. State Inmate Procedure under the AEDPA
State inmates must bring petitions for federal habeas corpus under
section 2254 or section 2241.118 First, however, state inmates must
exhaust all available state remedies before they can file a federal habeas
petition under section 2254.119 In addition, state inmates must meet one
of the threshold requirements under section 2254(d) for a reviewing
court 120 to grant a petition.121
If the state inmate meets one of the threshold requirements, the
inmate may proceed to file a federal habeas corpus petition under section
2254 or section 2241.122 Under section 2254(a), a state inmate may file
117. Id. For instance, a federal inmate can bring a claim under section 2241 if the correctional
facility does not carry out the sentence as required by law, or if the correctional facility does not
release the inmate after the expiration of his stated prison term. See, e.g., Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d
918, 920 (7th Cir. 2001). In Garza, the petitioner filed a habeas petition under section 2241,
arguing the execution of his sentence was illegal because it violated a treaty. Id. See also
Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1119. Stahlkopf explains the dichotomy between section 2255 and
section 2241 as follows:
Section 2255 is a statutory remedy distinct from habeas corpus itself, which is a nonstatutory remedy granted under § 2241. [S]ection 2255 has been treated by courts as the
remedy of first resort, and only when a court lacks jurisdiction under § 2255 can a
federal prisoner bring a habeas corpus petition under § 2241.
Id. Thus, federal inmates cannot challenge the execution of their sentence under section 2255
because section 2255 is not broad enough to encompass matters dealing with the execution of
sentences. Id. at 1120. See also United States v. Scott, 803 F.2d 1095, 1096 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding that section 2255 cannot be used for a claim challenging the execution of a sentence).
118. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c).
119. Id. Section 2254(b)(1) states that a court shall not grant a state inmate habeas relief
unless:
(A) the Applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.
Id.
120. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the standard of review for a federal habeas corpus claim is a
deference standard based on reasonableness, under which a reviewing federal court shall defer to the
state court as long as the decision was reasonable. Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas
Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 412-13 (1996).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d) provides that a reviewing court shall not grant a
habeas petition if a state court has already ruled on the merits of the case unless the adjudication of
the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law . . . or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
Id.
122. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(a).
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a petition “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”123 Furthermore, it
is unclear as to whether state inmates can avail themselves to section
2241 if the remedy under section 2254 is inadequate because the two
provisions provide similar relief.124 As such, it is unclear if there is a
distinction between the claims state inmates must file under section 2254
or section 2241, or if state inmates can pursue a remedy under section
2241 if the remedy under section 2254 does not provide adequate
relief.125 However, if state inmates follow the same procedures as
federal inmates and file challenges to the validity of their sentence under
section 2254 and challenges to the execution of their sentence under
section 2241, their claims will probably be valid.126
4. The Gatekeeper Provision of the AEDPA
The above process is not the final obstacle inmates must face before
a court will grant federal habeas corpus review under the AEDPA.127
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
124. See Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1121. Stahlkopf argues that there may be no real
distinction between the remedy provided in section 2241 and the remedy in section 2254. Id. This
results from the vague language in section 2254(a), which states that habeas relief shall be granted
“only on the ground that [the inmate] is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . .” See §
2254(a). This language is strikingly similar to the language in section 2241(c) which provides that
“[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [H]e is in custody in violation
of the Constitution . . . .” See § 2241(c)(3). As such, there may be no difference in the remedy
available. See Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1121. In addition, Stahlkopf notes there is little case
law to determine if state inmates may use section 2241 in the same way federal inmates can. Id.
Indeed, she states:
[T]he Supreme Court’s conflation of the two statutes, both in stating the substance of
petitioners’ claims and in citing the jurisdiction of the district courts, implies that there is
no sharp line to be drawn between the two when a state prisoner brings a petition
challenging the validity of his sentence.
Id. Stahlkopf concludes that state inmates, like federal inmates, can use section 2241 if the remedy
under section 2254 is unsatisfactory because of the similar language of each provision and because
there is no language in either provision barring state inmates from filing a petition under either
section. Id.
125. See Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1121. Some courts hold the remedies are the same
under section 2241 and section 2254. See, e.g., O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995). In
O’Neal, the petitioner filed his federal habeas petition under section 2254. Id. at 535. In the
decision, the Court used section 2254 and section 2241 synonymously when referring to habeas
corpus. See id. at 444. But see Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997). In this case, the
Seventh Circuit held that section 2241 and section 2254 provide distinct forms of relief. Id. at 43738. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, parallel to the requirements on federal inmates, state
claims challenging the validity of a conviction or a sentence should be filed under section 2254, and
those challenging the execution of a sentence should be filed under section 2241. Id.
126. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (b) & 2241(c).
127. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (1996) (containing the current gatekeeper provisions
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Indeed, the gatekeeper provision of section 2244(b) is perhaps the most
challenging obstacle inmates must overcome to have a court grant a
second or successive petition.128 The gatekeeper provision in section
2244(b) eliminates a reviewing court’s discretion to hear second or
successive petitions for habeas corpus.129 Under this provision, a claim
presented in a second or successive petition that was presented in a
previous petition must be dismissed.130 In addition, a claim presented in
a second or successive petition that was not presented in a previous
petition must also be dismissed unless the petitioner demonstrates that
the new claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that was
previously unavailable.”131
Inmates must also jump through additional hoops when filing
second or successive petitions for federal habeas review (such as in
Tyler).132 First, an inmate must file a motion with the appropriate United
States court of appeals for permission to file a second or successive
petition for federal habeas corpus review.133 If the circuit court grants
permission to file a second or successive petition, the inmate can then
file the habeas petition in the appropriate district court.134 For the
eliminating the reviewing court’s discretion in hearing second or successive petitions), with 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (1994) (containing the former gatekeeper provisions giving reviewing courts
discretion to hear a second or successive petition for federal habeas corpus). The new gatekeeper
provision eliminates the discretion that reviewing courts possessed before the enactment of the
AEDPA. Id. The prior system was more effective because it allowed reviewing courts to determine
if the claim in the second petition was a valid claim, and if so, the court could hear the case. Id.
Now, by eliminating a reviewing court’s discretion, the AEDPA closes the door to claims that do
have merit and should be heard. Id. The AEDPA makes it nearly impossible for a person whose
rights have been violated to file a second petition for habeas relief. Id. As such, the new provisions
do not afford inmates a chance for relief as provided by the United States Constitution. Thus, the
AEDPA bars claims with potential merit. Id. But see Statement of President Clinton, supra note 65
(supporting the AEDPA and the elimination a reviewing court’s discretion to review second or
successive petitions in order to stop the massive amounts of frivolous petitions).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
129. The state gatekeeper provision is in section 2244(b), and the federal gatekeeper provision
is in section 2244(b) and section 2255. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
132. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001). The procedure Tyler had to follow to be granted
review is a good example of the numerous procedural hurdles that inmates must comply with in
order to file a second or successive petition. Id. at 659-60.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In this motion, the inmate must make a prima facia showing
under section 2244(b)(2)(A) that his claim relies on a new rule made retroactive on collateral
review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). Section 2244(b)(4) provides that “[a] district court shall dismiss
any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to
be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.”
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district court to grant the petition, the inmate must actually show the new
claim falls within the standard set forth in section 2244(b)(2)(A).135
Finally, courts have treated the gatekeeper provision in section
2244(b)(2)(A) as barring second or successive petitions filed under
sections 2254 or 2255.136 However, courts have treated second or
successive petitions filed under section 2241 differently because section
2241 provides a different remedy than sections 2254 and 2255.137 For
example, section 2241 is the only method for federal inmates to
challenge the execution of their sentence.138 Moreover, section 2244(b)
and section 2255 are silent as to whether second or successive petitions
filed under the same section are barred.139 Section 2241 is also silent as
to whether a second petition filed under this section is barred.140
Therefore, a second petition filed under section 2241 is presumably
allowed because had Congress intended otherwise, they specifically
would have barred second or successive petitions filed under section
2241 as they did in sections 2254 and 2255.141

135. Id.
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). See also Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1122. For
example, if a federal inmate filed his first petition under section 2255 (challenging the imposition of
his sentence) and later filed another petition under section 2255, a reviewing court must dismiss the
second petition pursuant to section 2244(b)(1). Id. The same outcome would occur for a second
petition filed by a state inmate under section 2254 if that inmate also filed the first petition under
section 2254. Id.
137. See Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 1997). In Chambers, the
Second Circuit held the remedies under section 2241 and section 2255 are different. As such, the
court held that a second petition filed under section 2255 is not considered a second or successive
petition under the gatekeeper provision if the previous petition was filed under section 2241. Id.
The remedy under section 2241 is different from section 2255 because section 2255 allows federal
inmates to challenge the imposition of their sentence, while section 2241 allows federal inmates to
challenge the execution of their sentence. Id. Section 2255 is not broad enough to allow federal
inmates to challenge issues dealing with the execution of their sentence. Id.
138. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241, with 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2241 is the only provision in
the AEDPA that courts have interpreted broadly enough to allow federal inmates to raise challenges
based on the execution of their sentences. See Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1121-22.
139. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
141. See Stahlkopf, supra note 113, at 1124. A second or successive petition filed under either
section 2254 or section 2255 is barred if the inmate filed the first petition under the same section.
See id. However, if the inmate files the first habeas petition under either section 2254 or section
2255, and the second petition under section 2241, the second petition is probably not barred. Id.
This is because section 2244 explicitly states a second claim filed under 2254 is barred, and section
2255 explicitly forbids the filing of a second petition. Id. However, section 2241 has no language
forbidding a second or successive petition. Id. As such, there presumably are no restrictions to
filing a second petition under section 2241 because had the drafters of the AEDPA intended there to
be a bar, they would have included it within the statute as they did with the other provisions. See id.
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B. The Effect of Tyler v. Cain on the “Great Writ”
It is premature to speculate as to all of the affects Tyler v. Cain will
have on federal habeas corpus. It is apparent, however, that the Court’s
myopic interpretation of the gatekeeper provision significantly narrows
federal habeas review.142 The decision virtually eliminates both federal
and state inmates’ ability to challenge their conviction or sentence
through second or successive habeas petitions.143 The majority in Tyler
reached its decision by focusing on the construction144 of section
2244(b)(2)(A).145 The Court interpreted this provision to mean that new
rules of constitutional law146 could apply retroactively to cases on
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a second or successive petition is barred unless:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable. . . .
Id. Many scholars have criticized the Court’s narrowing of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Douglas W.
Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences,
43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995) (criticizing the Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane). But see Sharad
Sushil Khandelwal, Note, The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1),
96 MICH. L. REV. 434 (1997). In this article, the author provides a justification for narrowing
federal habeas corpus:
Victims and their families found habeas corpus a torturous process, prolonging their
agony by adding another layer of “appeals” to an already overburdened criminal justice
system. It also led to inefficient expenditures of courts’ time and attention, with federal
judges facing towering stacks of barely legible handwritten petitions, very few of which
were likely to raise valid constitutional claims.
Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
143. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001). Inmates have already felt the effects of
Tyler. See, e.g., Forbes v. United States, 262 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2001). In Forbes, the petitioner
filed a successive petition under section 2255 claiming that the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey
(pertaining to jury instructions) should apply retroactively to his case. Id. The Second Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court has never held that Apprendi applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review. Id. at 144-45. As such, the Second Circuit denied the petition pursuant to section 2255
because the petitioner could not establish that the Court made the new rule retroactive as required
under section 2244(b)(2)(A). See id.
144. See Kimberly Woolley, supra note 112, at 424-25. Many scholars and courts agree that
the provisions of the AEDPA are vague. Id. These ambiguities are one reason why the doctrine of
habeas corpus is misunderstood and why different courts interpret the provisions to mean different
things. Woolley argues the vagueness of the AEDPA “leaves room for a variety of interpretations.”
Id. at 425. For instance, section 2241(c) states “the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . (3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). In addition, Justice Souter criticized the AEDPA, stating “in a world of silk purses and
pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting.” Id. at 424-25 (quoting Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997)). But see Tyler, 533 U.S. 656. In Tyler, the Court recognized
section 2244(b)(2)(A) was somewhat vague, but the rules of statutory construction could resolve
any ambiguity within the provision. Id. at 662.
145. See id. at 662-63.
146. A new rule of constitutional law is one that breaks new ground, imposes a new obligation
on the States or the Federal government, or is a holding whose result was not dictated by precedent
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collateral review only if the Court holds the new rule applies
retroactively on collateral review.147
Before Tyler v. Cain and the AEDPA, inmates that filed second or
successive petitions stood a better chance of obtaining federal review
because of the more relaxed standards of retroactivity.148 Under the
former statute, a petitioner could argue that a new rule of constitutional
law promulgated by the Court (which could potentially exonerate the
inmate) should apply retroactively on collateral review if the rule fell
under one of the two exceptions found in Teague v. Lane.149 For
example, an inmate could have argued the new rule was a watershed
rule, and thus the discretionary gatekeeper provision under former
section 2244 would not bar the second petition.150 As such, inmates
could still file a second or successive petition that relied on a new rule,
while the reviewing courts still maintained the power to deny the
petition if it was without merit.151
After the adoption of the AEDPA, inmates could still attempt to
have the reviewing court entertain a second or successive petition based
on the two exceptions found in Teague.152 Congress codified the Court’s
existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Joanne T. Hannaway, Note, O’Dell v.
Netherland: A Bedrock Principle of Fundamental Fairness?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 943, 960 (1998).
See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
147. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662. The Court interpreted the phrase “made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court” by using the plain meaning of the text read as a whole. Id.
The Court acknowledged the word “made” was somewhat ambiguous. Id. However, the Court
stated the meaning of a statutory term should be interpreted “in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme,” not in a vacuum. Id. (quoting Davis v. Michigan
Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Under this standard, the Court held that, based
on the definition of “made” as “to make” found in Webster’s Dictionary and the context of its use in
the statute, the word “made” is synonymous with the word cause, or hold. See id. As such, the
Court concluded the only way a rule can be “made” retroactive per section 2244(b)(2)(A) is if the
Court “holds” that the rule applies retroactivly to cases on collateral review. See id.
148. See former 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994).
149. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. Before the AEDPA and Tyler, courts
reviewing second or successive petitions for habeas corpus had the discretion to determine if they
should entertain the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994). Thus, an inmate filing a second petition could
have argued that the reviewing court should entertain the petition because the new rule falls under
one of the Teague exceptions. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288.
150. See former 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994) (giving the reviewing court discretion to grant a
second petition).
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 55 and 56. For example, imagine the Supreme Court holds that police
interrogation is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. A federal inmate who was
interrogated by police had previously challenged the validity of his conviction by filing a habeas
petition under section 2255. Now, the inmate wants to challenge his conviction and take advantage
of the new constitutional rule promulgated by the Court by filing another habeas petition under
section 2255. Before Tyler, the inmate could have argued the new rule should apply retroactively
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decision in Teague v. Lane in the AEDPA, but left out the two
exceptions when new rules apply retroactively on collateral review.153
Thus, it was not clear if the two exceptions in Teague were still good
law or if a new rule could apply retroactively on collateral review if it
fell into the one of the two Teague exceptions.154 As such, the AEDPA
by itself did not close the door on second or successive habeas corpus
petitions.155 In was not until the decision in Tyler v. Cain that the door
to second or successive petitions was closed.156
because it qualified as a watershed rule under Teague and thus, the successive petition would not be
barred under the gatekeeper provision in section 2244(b)(2)(A). Although this approach might not
have been successful, the inmate at least had a chance to be heard and had a remote possibility the
reviewing court would grant the petition. Now, under Tyler, the same inmate’s claim is barred
under the gatekeeper provision in section 2244(b)(2)(A) unless the Court specifically holds the new
rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Therefore, the decision in Tyler places a
significant limitation on an inmate’s ability to file petitions for federal habeas corpus.
153. Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the
Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 590 (1999). Chen states:
[T]he new statute doesn’t codify Teague’s exceptions. Under Teague, a federal court
could enforce an otherwise non-retroactive new constitutional rule in a habeas
proceeding if the new rule: (1) went to the fundamental fairness of the state criminal
proceeding and could affect the accuracy of the guilt determination; or (2) placed the
conduct for which the petitioner was convicted beyond the realm of the criminal law to
prohibit. To illustrate the conflict between Teague and [section] 2254(d)(1), imagine
that the Court announces a watershed new rule that fits into one of Teague’s exceptions
after a prisoner’s state conviction becomes final, and that the rule would have benefited
her had it been the law during her direct appeal. She could successfully seek review
under Teague, but the new statute would supersede Teague’s application . . . . In other
words, the statute by its own terms appears to forbid any retroactive application of a
constitutional rule.
Id. at 590-91 (citation omitted).
154. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. Inmates could argue that new rules should
apply retroactively on collateral review if the rule falls under one of the exceptions in Teague. Id.
155. For example, before Tyler, inmates seeking habeas review could make other, more
complex arguments that new rules should apply retroactively on collateral review. For example, an
inmate could argue the Court made the new rule retroactive to cases on collateral review over a span
of two or three cases. An inmate could also claim, as the defendant did in Tyler, that a new rule in
one decision was made retroactive through a subsequent decision because the second decision
qualified the rule under one of the exceptions in Teague, thus implicitly making the rule retroactive
on collateral review. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 665 (2001). In Tyler, the defendant argued the
new rule of constitutional law in Cage v. Louisiana should be given retroactive effect because
Sullivan v. Louisiana made the Cage rule fall under one of the exceptions in Teague v. Lane. Id.
The Court disagreed. Id. However, the Court noted that it did have the power to make a rule
retroactive over the span of two or more cases “with the right combination of holdings . . . only if
the holdings in those cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule.” Id. at 666.
156. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665-66. In Tyler, the Court held the only way under section
2244(b)(2)(A) for a new rule to apply retroactively is by a holding of the Court declaring that the
rule applies retroactively. Id. at 662. As such, the Court has effectively eliminated any remaining
discretion of reviewing courts by solidifying the language in section 2244 to mean that only the
Court itself has the power to make a rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. See id. Thus, all
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Moreover, the Court’s decision in Tyler effectively eliminates the
two exceptions found in Teague v. Lane, which in turn makes the
doctrine in Teague obsolete.157 A syllogism can best elucidate this
argument. Section 2244(b)(2)(A) states that a second petition for federal
habeas corpus cannot be heard unless the previously unavailable claim
relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactively to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court.158 The Court held in Tyler that,
pursuant to section 2244(b)(2)(A), a new rule of constitutional law can
only be applied retroactively on collateral review if the Court holds the
law applies retroactively on collateral review.159 Therefore, based on a
combination of the AEDPA and its interpretation by the Court, the only
time a new rule of constitutional law can apply to a second or successive
petition for habeas corpus is when the Court holds the rule applies
retroactively.160 As such, the exceptions in Teague can no longer apply
to second or successive petitions for habeas corpus, thus making Teague
obsolete.161

inmates filing a second or successive petitions seeking to use a new decision to exonerate
themselves will be barred under section 2244(b)(2)(A) unless the Court makes the rule retroactive.
Inmates can no longer argue their case falls under one of the two exceptions in Teague because the
exceptions are now moot for the purposes of section 2244(b)(2)(A). But see generally Statement by
Senator Hatch, supra note 60 (arguing that the need to curb abusive or frivolous petitions warrants
the possible adverse effects the AEDPA will have on inmates).
157. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662, 665-66. See, e.g., Banks v. Horn, 271 F.3d 527, 542 n.13
(2001). In Banks, the Third Circuit stated:
Because we find Teague not to govern our analysis, our discussion of its principles are
limited to explaining why it is not controlling here, despite the arguments of the parties.
We note, however, that recent decisions have called into question to what extent Teague
has continued force independent of [the] AEDPA.
Id. (citations omitted).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
159. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662.
160. Id. But see Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor noted
the exceptions in Teague are still viable and as such, the Court could make a rule retroactive to
cases on collateral review without expressly holding it to be retroactive by announcing a rule that
fell into the second exception under Teague. See also id. at 671 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. Before Tyler, there were generally three ways an inmate could argue a new rule should
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review — by direct ruling of the Court, by falling under
one exceptions in Teague, or over multiple decisions that qualify a rule under one of the exceptions
found in Teague. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989); Tyler,
533 U.S. at 666. However, the Court eliminated the second and third arguments by holding the only
way a new rule can apply retroactively to cases on collateral review under section 2244(b)(2)(A) is
if the Court holds the rule applies retroactively. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665.
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C. Tyler v. Cain Violates the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution
The decision in Tyler v. Cain violates the Suspension Clause of
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution162
because it virtually eliminates habeas corpus review for a large group of
inmates (those inmates filing a second or successive petition for habeas
Tyler, when read in conjunction with the AEDPA,
relief).163
significantly restricts federal habeas by imposing procedural barriers that
make it nearly impossible for inmates to raise meaningful claims after
their first petition for habeas review.164 The writ is suspended because
the gatekeeper provision bars a second petition if it raises a claim
previously presented in a prior petition.165 Furthermore, a second
petition raising a new claim is barred unless the claim relies on a new
rule made retroactive by the Court.166 Under the standard in Tyler,
inmates have no further means to pursue a claim under federal habeas
corpus if the Court has not held that the new rule applies retroactively on
collateral review.167 Thus, the decision in Tyler effectively suspends the
162. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 provides that: “[T]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text for an analysis of
the writ during early American history.
163. Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just Because John Marshall Said
It, Doesn’t Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 535-36
(2000). Freedman notes that Congress could violate the Suspension Clause by imposing restrictions
on habeas corpus. Id. at 536. The AEDPA is an example of a restriction that could violate the
Suspension Clause. See generally id.
164. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 49 DUKE L.J. 947 (2000). Hoffstadt maintains that Congress and the Supreme Court have
significantly restricted the availability of federal habeas corpus, especially to state inmates on death
row. Id. at 950-51, nn.1-4. Congress expanded procedural barriers to federal habeas, such as the
gatekeeper provision in section 2244(b), and threshold requirements such as in section 2254(d). Id.
In addition, the Court has narrowed the scope of federal habeas by their rulings which have
“eliminated habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims and claims premised on developments in
the law arising after a prisoner’s direct appeal is over.” Id. Furthermore, the Court interpreted the
new provisions of the AEDPA narrowly, which also contributed to the restrictions on federal
habeas. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. at 663-65. See also Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as a
Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A Tribute Which May Also Be a Eulogy, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1477, 1489 (1996) (arguing that the AEDPA narrows the availability of habeas
corpus to a large group of inmates and has the hardest impact on death row inmates). But see
Statement of President Clinton, supra note 65. President Clinton and Congress advocated
streamlining the appeal process for prisoners sentenced to death by eliminating extra or frivolous
delays in the execution. Id.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
167. See id.
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writ of habeas corpus for a significant number of state and federal
inmates.168
For instance, in Felker v. Turpin,169 the defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the AEDPA under the suspension clause.170 The
Court held the gatekeeper provision of the AEDPA did not violate the
Suspension Clause171 of the United States Constitution.172 The Court
168. But see Woolley, supra note 112, at 415. Woolley provides an explanation for suspending
inmates’ ability to file second or successive petitions. Woolley notes that Congress enacted the
AEDPA shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing. Id. She states that “[t]he habeas corpus reform
was added to the AEDPA, however, because Congress correctly believed that in the event someone
was convicted of the Oklahoma bombing, he likely would receive the death sentence . . . . A
primary goal of the AEDPA’s habeas reform is to eliminate lengthy delays between sentencing and
execution.” Id. at 415. Thus, one of the main reasons Congress enacted the AEDPA was to
prosecute and execute terrorists such as the Oklahoma City bomber in a more efficient way. Id.
169. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
170. Id. In Felker, the defendant was convicted of capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy,
and false imprisonment and was sentenced to death. Id. at 655. The defendant pursued all state
remedies and was denied relief, and then filed his first writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Id. at 655-56. The Federal District Court denied
relief and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Id. The defendant filed a
second petition for federal habeas corpus under section 2254 with the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals a few days before his scheduled execution. Id. The Eleventh Circuit denied his request for
habeas relief as well. Id. The defendant then filed certiorari and a writ of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari and a stay of his execution. Id. The defendant
claimed the AEDPA violated the suspension clause of U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl.2 because section
2244(b) barred the second petition. Id.
171. The Court began its analysis by distinguishing the writ of habeas corpus as it existed when
the framers drafted the Suspension Clause with the writ of habeas corpus as it exists today. Felker,
518 U.S. at 663-64. The Court stated:
The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which
exists today. As we explained previously, the first Congress made the writ of habeas
corpus available only to prisoners confined under the authority of the United States, not
under state authority . . . . It was not until 1867 that Congress made the writ generally
available in “all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States . . . .” But we
assume, for purposes of decision here, that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution
refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than as it existed in 1789. The [AEDPA]
requires a habeas petitioner to obtain leave from the court of appeals before filing a
second habeas petition in the district court. But this requirement simply transfers from
the district court to the court of appeals a screening function which would previously
have been performed by the district court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [and] Rule
9(b).
The Act also codifies some of the pre-existing limits on successive petitions, and further
restricts the availability of relief to habeas petitioners. But we have long recognized that
“the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by
written law,” and we likewise recognize that judgments about the proper scope of the
writ are “normally for Congress to make.”
Id. at 664 (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 664. The Court further held:
The new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a
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implied that the new restrictions imposed by the AEDPA were part of
the natural evolution of the doctrine in response to the growing abuse of
the writ.173 Thus, the gatekeeper provision of the AEDPA, by itself,
does not violate the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution.174
The holding in Tyler however, when read in conjunction with the
AEDPA, imposes restrictions on habeas corpus that violate the
Suspension Clause. As noted above, the AEDPA imposes restrictions
on habeas corpus to reduce the abuse of the writ, but it did not entirely
suspend the availability review for inmates filing a second or successive
petition.175 In Tyler, the Court transforms the hurdles found in the

restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice “abuse of the writ.” In McCleskey v.
Zant, we said that “the doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving
body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory
developments, and judicial decisions.” The added restrictions which the Act places on
second habeas petitions are well within the compass of this evolutionary process, and we
hold that they do not amount to “suspension” of the writ contrary to Article I, § 9.
Id. (citations omitted).
173. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664. In Felker, the Court provided a cursory explanation as to why
the gatekeeper provision of the AEDPA does not violate the suspension clause. See id. at 664-65.
However, the Court reserved its power to grant an original writ when exceptional circumstances
warrant the use of this power. Id. at 665. Many scholars believe that the Court has been avoiding
the constitutional issues dealing with habeas reform. See, e.g., Note, The Avoidance of
Constitutional Questions and the Preservation of Judicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the
New Habeas Provisions, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1582 (1998). The author states:
The Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Felker is the most prominent example of
constitutional avoidance in the habeas context. Relying in large part on Yerger, the
Court explicitly adhered to the canon disfavoring repeals by implication and assumed
that the Court continued to possess the broad power to issue an original writ in a
deserving case, despite the AEDPA’s new restrictions on habeas jurisdiction. The Court
did not delve into the debates over whether the new provisions violate the Suspension
Clause or go beyond the Exceptions Clause, noting instead that the Court retained its
powers to grant an original writ of habeas corpus when “exceptional circumstances”
counsel in favor of granting relief. By following this approach, the Court both avoided
having to rule decisively on the constitutionality of the provisions barring successive
petitions and reiterated its authority to exercise judicial review (through the power to
issue original writs) in cases raising serious constitutional concerns. Thus, although the
outcome of Felker upheld the AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions for successive petitions,
the opinion also actively defended the Court’s jurisdiction.
Id. at 1582-83 (citations omitted).
174. Felker, 518 U.S. at 665.
175. See id. After Felker, inmates still had other avenues to obtain review for a second or
successive petition for habeas corpus under the AEDPA. See supra notes 148-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion about how federal inmates could still be heard on a second
petition even under the limitations imposed by the AEDPA. For example, inmates could avail
themselves to the exception in section 2244(b)(2)(A) by arguing that their claim relies on a new rule
made retroactive by the Court by falling under an exception in Teague v. Lane.
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AEDPA into brick walls.176 For example, an inmate who raises the same
claim from a prior petition in a second or successive petition is totally
barred from raising the claim again, even if a new rule could
demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights at the trial.177
Moreover, an inmate raising a claim in a second petition based on a new
rule the inmate did not raise in the previous petition is still barred under
the gatekeeper provision unless the new rule applies retroactively on
collateral review through a holding of the Court.178 Therefore, inmates
filing second or successive petitions have no other avenue of obtaining
habeas relief unless the Court has made the rule retroactive on collateral
review. As such, the narrow interpretation of section 2244(b)(2)(A)
unconstitutionally restricts the availability of habeas corpus to a
substantial number of inmates.
D. The Social Consequences of Tyler v. Cain: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
In Tyler v. Cain, the Court’s narrow interpretation of the gatekeeper
provision of the AEDPA places significant limitations on the availability
of the federal writ of habeas corpus, which in turn furthers the goals of
the AEDPA.179 One of the main goals of the AEDPA is to reduce the
time between a death row inmate’s conviction and sentence, and his
execution.180 Another, more widespread goal of the AEDPA is to curb
176. See generally Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
177. Id. at 660.
178. Id. at 662. This scenario happened in Tyler, where the defendant tried to apply the new
rule in Cage v. Louisiana (concerning jury instructions) retroactively on collateral review to show
that the jury instructions on the standard of proof in his trial were incorrect and could have been
prejudicial to his case. Id. at 661-62. The new rule could have been beneficial to Tyler if he could
have demonstrated the instructions in his case were indeed incorrect. Id. However, Tyler could not
raise the claim because the Court held that it had not made the rule in Cage retroactive to cases on
collateral review. Id. at 662.
179. See Statement of Senator Hatch, supra note 60 for a discussion of the benefits of
narrowing the federal writ of habeas corpus. See also Statement of President Clinton, supra note 65
(supporting the narrowing of federal habeas corpus to eliminate abuse of the writ).
180. Woolley, supra note 112, at 415. Woolley states that to achieve this goal, the AEDPA
“makes several changes to already existing habeas legislation,” making it harder for inmates to file
federal habeas petitions. See id. at 415-16. Woolley also states that:
Arguably, the AEDPA is unconstitutional. Such an argument is unlikely to prevail,
however, in light of the Supreme Court’s current composition. In Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s annual report on the state of the federal judiciary, he praised the AEDPA,
stating that it contained “valuable reforms that will improve the administration of
justice.” In addition, the Supreme Court recently upheld the Act’s provisions concerning
second and successive petitions in Felker v. Turpin. Based on Rehnquist’s assessment of
the AEDPA and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Felker, it seems futile to ask the Supreme
Court to find the AEDPA facially unconstitutional.
Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
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the general abuse of the federal writ of habeas corpus.181
Arguably, the main benefit of the decision in Tyler is the
furtherance of the goals of the AEDPA.182 First, the holding in Tyler
will most likely reduce the amount of time between a death row inmate’s
sentence and his subsequent execution.183 Next, the decision in Tyler
will probably reduce the number of federal habeas petitions actually
heard by courts each year.184 The narrow interpretation of the
gatekeeper provision effectively bars second or successive habeas
petitions unless they rely on a new rule of constitutional law made
retroactive by the Court.185 The fewer federal habeas petitions that
181. See Mark M. Oh, Note, The Gateway for Successive Habeas Petitions: An Argument for
Schlup v. Delo’s Probability Standard for Actual Innocence Claims, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2341,
2354-55 (1998). The author notes the legislative history of the AEDPA demonstrates Congress’
intent “to accord greater finality to convictions and to prevent abuses of the writ of habeas corpus.”
Id. at 2354. These goals are accomplished by imposing the one-year time limit and the stricter
procedural requirements under the gatekeeper provision. See Woolley, supra note 112, at 415-16.
182. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 660-64.
183. See id. Under Tyler, the time between a death row inmate’s sentence and execution will
probably be expedited for two reasons. First, death row inmates will not be able to file second or
successive petitions for federal habeas relief if the second or successive petitions are barred under
the gatekeeper provision. As a result of the strict interpretation of the gatekeeper provision in Tyler,
there will be less delays in the execution process because inmates will not be able to continuously
file habeas petitions to delay the execution. As such, the time between sentencing and execution
will be faster. Second, the overall effect of Tyler could also result in faster executions. Under
Tyler, all inmates throughout the country are barred from filing a second or successive federal
habeas petition unless they can prove the petition relies on a new constitutional rule made
retroactive by the Court. Most petitioners will not be able to meet this burden. As such, the number
of overall petitions should decrease because of the procedural bar, thus allowing for claims validly
brought under the AEDPA to be heard in a more rapid manner. Reviewing courts will be able to
dispose of habeas petitions validly filed by death row inmates more efficiently and speed up the
time between sentencing and execution. But see Woolley, supra note 112, at 429-30. Woolley
argues the AEDPA will not reduce the number of habeas petitions filed each year because more
inmates would file pro se petitions for habeas review to avoid the expiration of the one-year
deadline, thus increasing the amount of frivolous petitions filed each year. See id. at 430. This
argument still holds force after the decision in Tyler because it will be likely that inmates will raise
all possible issues in their first habeas petition because of the bar on second or successive petitions,
thus increasing the amount of frivolous claims each year. Id.
184. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661-62.
185. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Tyler significantly limits the availability of
federal habeas review by narrowing the interpretation of the gatekeeper provision in section
2244(b)(2)(A). Tyler, 522 U.S. at 661-62. Based on the Court’s interpretation, the gatekeeper now
bars all second or successive habeas petitions unless the petition raises a new claim that relies on a
new rule made retroactive expressly by the Court. Id. Through this, state and federal inmates will
not be able to bring a second or successive petition unless they can show the Court expressly made
the new rule retroactive. As such, the decision in Tyler is a victory for the proponents of limiting
habeas corpus like Senator Hatch. But with every victory comes a price. Under the doctrine
established in Tyler, inmates whose constitutional rights have been violated will have no forum to
present their claims after they have filed their first writ of habeas corpus, and, in turn, the
constitutional violations will remain unheard based on this procedural bar. Id. at 662-63.
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reviewing courts must entertain each year will in turn make the
reviewing time of the petitions validly brought under the AEDPA faster.
Finally, Tyler v. Cain might eliminate some confusion about federal
habeas corpus and retroactivity.186 Thus, Tyler may be beneficial
because it may speed up the review process for petitions, narrow the
abuse of the writ, and eliminate some confusion in the law of habeas
corpus and retroactivity.
There are a number of negative consequences of the Court’s narrow
interpretation of the gatekeeper provision of the AEDPA in Tyler v.
Cain.187 First, death row inmates will have fewer opportunities to
challenge their conviction and sentence.188 As a nation, we place a
significant value on human life. As such, judicial economy should not
be the pivotal factor in carrying out executions of death row inmates,
especially if there is a claim that an inmate’s constitutional rights have
been violated.189 Instead, inmates sentenced to death should be afforded
186. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663. The rule promulgated by the Court in Tyler is that under
section 2244(b)(2)(A) of the AEDPA, a new rule is only made retroactive if the Court holds the rule
applies retroactively on collateral review. Id. The Court stated that it:
[D]oes not “make” a rule retroactive when it merely establishes principles of
retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. In such an
event, any legal conclusion that is derived from the principles is developed by the lower
court (or perhaps by a combination of courts), not by the Supreme Court.
Id. Thus, the decision should eliminate confusion about whether a new rule made by the Court
applies retroactively on collateral review because the only time it can be made retroactive is through
a holding by the Court. See id. But see Tyler, 533 U.S. at 667 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In the
dissent, Justice Breyer argues the decision in Tyler will only add further procedural complexity to
this area of law. Id. He states:
After today’s opinion, the only way in which this Court can make a rule such as Cage’s
retroactive is to repeat its Sullivan reasoning in a case triggered by a prisoner’s filing a
first habeas petition (a “second or successive” petition itself being barred by the
provision here at issue) or in some other case that presents the issue in a posture that
allows such language to have the status of a “holding.” Then, after the Court takes the
case and says that it meant what it previously said, prisoners could file “second or
successive” petitions to take advantage of the now-clearly-made-applicable new rule.
We will be required to restate the obvious, case by case, even when we have explicitly
said, but not ‘held’ that a new rule is retroactive.
Id.
187. Id. at 661-62.
188. See id. After Tyler, death row inmates will have no ability to challenge their sentences
and convictions after they have filed their first federal habeas petition unless the second or
successive petition relies on a new rule made retroactive by the Court through a holding. Id.
189. See Tabak, supra note 164, at 1489. Although the article was written before the Court
handed down Tyler, the arguments the author makes about habeas reform are still very relevant.
The author states:
The principal reason why habeas “reform” legislation has been enacted is that Congress
and much of the public assume that habeas claims are almost always frivolous, and they
want death row inmates to get executed quickly. However . . . in a very significant
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greater protections under the constitution and should have more chances
to challenge their conviction and sentence.190
In addition, the holding in Tyler also blindly eliminates federal
habeas review for a substantial number of the inmates incarcerated
throughout the country. The Court’s narrow interpretation of section
2244(b)(2)(A) eliminates both frivolous and non-frivolous second or
successive habeas petitions unless the petition relies on a new
constitutional rule made retroactive by a holding of the Court.191
Inmates whose rights have been violated can no longer challenge their
convictions through a second or successive habeas petition unless their
claim relies on a new rule expressly made retroactive by the Court.192
As such, the holding in Tyler conflicts with the original purpose of the
“Great Writ.”193 Federal habeas corpus is now worthless to a large
group of inmates whose constitutional rights have been violated because
percentage of cases - well over forty percent - habeas claims of death row inmates are
not only not frivolous; they concern serious, nonharmless violations of the
Constitution . . . . Sadly, an inevitable effect of the habeas-curtailing law enacted in
April 1996 will be to increase the number of executed people whose rights under the
Constitution have been violated through harmful errors. Moreover, these “reforms” will
not materially save on costs and will add to, not diminish, delays.
Id. (citation omitted).
190. See e.g., Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992). In this article, the authors focus on the problems with capital
punishment and the need for greater safeguards in capital punishment cases. See id. The decision in
Tyler narrows the availability of habeas corpus for death row inmates, and thus eliminates a vital
procedural safeguard in capital cases. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661-62. However, the Court’s apathy
towards death row inmates is not a recent development. Chief Justice Rehnquist once stated “[l]ets
get on with it” when referring to the execution of on an inmate in the early 1990s. See Austin Sarat,
Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J.
1103, 1103 (1995). The decision in Tyler is another example of the Court’s indifference towards
death row inmates. Id. By limiting the availability of habeas corpus, the Court is doing as
Rehnquist suggests — getting on with executions. Id. However, the consequences of executing an
innocent person or a person whose rights have been violated are great. Id. Life is the most valuable
human right. Death row inmates should not be denied a forum to challenge their convictions based
on a violation of their constitutional rights, but the Court believes the benefits of such a rule
outweigh the social costs. See id. at 1104.
191. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662.
192. Id. See Forbes v. United States, 262 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2001). In Forbes, the petitioner
filed a successive petition under section 2255. Id. at 145. The petitioner argued the new
constitutional rule announced by the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey (pertaining to jury
instructions) should apply retroactively to his case on collateral review. Id. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals denied the successive petition as per section 2244(b)(2)(A) because the Supreme
Court had not made the rule in Apprendi retroactive as required in Tyler. See id. at 145-46.
193. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text Originally, federal habeas corpus was a
vehicle under which inmates could challenge the validity of their conviction or sentence. See
Hartman, supra note 6, at 348. The Court offends the original purposes of habeas corpus by further
narrowing the already constricted habeas requirements under the AEDPA and making it harder for
inmates to file second or successive petitions. See id. at 349-50.
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these inmates can no longer challenge their convictions through second
or successive habeas petitions. 194
The consequences of Tyler v. Cain outweigh the potential benefits.
All inmates, especially death row inmates, should be able to challenge
their convictions if the government violated their constitutional rights.195
In should not matter how many petitions for the federal writ of habeas
corpus inmates have filed. Judicial economy should not outweigh
constitutional rights.196 As such, the social consequences of the decision
in Tyler outweigh the potential benefits of the Court’s holding.
V. CONCLUSION
In Tyler, there were two general paths the Court could have
followed to decide the case. The first path led to reducing the
availability of federal habeas corpus. The second path led to lessening
some of the procedural barriers contained in the AEDPA, making it
easier for inmates to file a second or successive habeas petition.
Unfortunately, the Court selected the wrong path when it narrowly
interpreted the gatekeeper provision of the AEDPA.197
The Court’s narrow construction of the procedural limitations on
habeas corpus in the gatekeeper provision make it nearly impossible for
state and federal inmates to file a second or successive petition for
habeas corpus.198 In addition, the narrow interpretation of section
2244(b)(2)(A) violates the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution because it “suspends” the “Great Writ” for inmates whose
constitutional rights have been violated, but can no longer file a petition
because it would be barred under Tyler.199 Finally, the social
194. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661-62.
195. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 6.
196. As noted above, one of the main concerns of the AEDPA is to speed up the execution
process and to eliminate frivolous habeas corpus petitions. Woolley, supra note 112, at 415.
However, there are less burdensome methods that Congress and the Court should consider that
promote judicial economy and reduce frivolous claims, instead of the blanket procedural
requirement that virtually eliminates all second or successive habeas petitions. See Tyler, 533 U.S.
at 661. For example, Congress or the federal judiciary could enact some type of filter for federal
habeas petitions to eliminate frivolous claims, but allow claims with merit to proceed. In addition,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 of the United States Constitution states that Congress has the power to
create inferior tribunals. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Under this power, Congress could create
special federal courts designed specifically to entertain habeas corpus petitions and thus reduce the
burden on other federal courts.
197. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 661.
198. See supra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
199. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662. The Court effectively denies review of a second or successive
habeas petition by holding that the only time a new rule is made retroactive under section
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consequences of Tyler outweigh the potential benefits of the holding.200
All citizens of the United States, including inmates, deserve a forum to
raise potential constitutional violations. Under Tyler, inmates barred
from filing a second or successive petition are denied this forum and
have no other alternative to collaterally challenge their convictions and
sentences unless they fall into one of the narrow exceptions under the
AEDPA. 201 Therefore, the procedural barriers of the AEDPA, when
combined with the decision in Tyler v. Cain, signify the end of the road
for collateral review.202 Consequently, the voices of the inmates whose
constitutional rights have been violated will remain unheard.
Ronn Gehring

2244(b)(2)(A) is when the Court holds that the rule applies retroactively on collateral review. Id.
200. See supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
201. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 662.
202. See id. at 661-62. Tyler is the end of the road for the collateral review of second or
successive federal habeas petitions because the Court’s narrow interpretation of section
2244(b)(2)(A) makes it almost impossible for inmates to file these petitions unless their claims fall
into one of the exceptions. Id. As such, the Court has effectively eliminated federal habeas review
of second or successive petitions. See id.
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